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Political Cohesion, Friendship and Hostility
In a pluralist democracy, with different values ​​and interests, with different social classes
and political organizations holding different ideologies, political cohesion is essential as the
groups should all work for progress and security for the whole political body, despite all
divergences.  With  regard  to  political  cohesion,  a  large  literature  focalizes  on  group
identities and on emotions as catalysts for group-based political action. The broad consensus
is that political cohesion is based on the development of strong and subjective identities that
are central in the construction of a socio-political membership.[1]
According  to  Henri  Tajfel,  a  social  identity  implies  “knowledge  of  his  (individual)
membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance
attached to the membership.”[2] In other words, the starting point of political cohesion, i.e.
social identity, is a set of beliefs forming a collective consciousness and a set of emotional
states.
It  is  also necessary to consider that  in  today’s  Western societies  the consequences of
globalization have exacerbated the disparities linked to social, economic, cultural and ethnic
situations and weakened the bonds of affinity and solidarity between individuals. Social
fragmentation and weak civic trust impact negatively on perceptions of the political body,
since weak social cohesion hinders the development of civic engagement and collective
political action.
Division  of  labour,  objective  solidarity  and  equality  formed  the  prevailing  conceptual
framework used for thinking about socio-political cohesion and social identity in most of the
countries of Western Europe during the years that the French economist Jean Fourastié
called les “trente glorieuses”,[3] This conceptual horizon changed at the beginning of the
1980s, when words such as solidarity and equality disappeared from the socio-political
discourse.
To understand the new system of thought we can refer fruitfully to the analysis that M.
Foucault developed in the courses held between 1977 and 1979 at the Collège de France on
the new form of liberal political rationality that he called neo-liberalism.[4] According to
Foucault the specificness of this form of liberalism lies in a new function of the market: the
market’s  operating mechanisms now correct  public  and social  policies,  whereas before
public policy had the task of correcting any negative effects of the market. The key to the
new function of the market is competition, which in turn becomes the regulating principle of
social, public and private behaviour.
Competition is not thought of as a natural fact whose development can be sustained by
eliminating obstacles, correcting deviations. Competition, according to Foucault, is an idea
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to be implemented with a continuous action at all levels, public and private. The state must
ensure that its members acquire the ability to sustain competition, even by competing with
each other. Competition, continues Foucault, is a “formal game between inequalities”.[5]
Competition breaks the bonds of interdependence that underlie social cohesion based on the
division of labour. Competition implies a logic of separation that leads groups, whether
economic, ethnic or religious, to close the groups in on themselves in order to defend their
chances of survival or their cultural values.
We can say with Robert Castel[6] that the old social question is reformulated in a new
framework: namely that the problems are always the same: poverty, unemployment, and
marginalization of the weakest groups, immigrants etc., but that the way in which these
problems put society at risk has changed. As has been observed, it is no longer a matter of
class conflict in the name of political and social equality, but of an internal destabilization
coming from the outside, for example, from international competition (arriving immigrants,
the employment effects of offshoring etc.). It follows that the perception of social identity
changes. It can no longer be based on class-consciousness, solidarity among individuals and
common interests. All of this raises an important question regarding the conditions under
which  political  cohesion  can  be  generated.  Since  the  collective  conscience  based  on
solidarity, interest and the common good is no longer valid, it is necessary to address or to
accentuate the emotional bonds of belonging.
 
Civic friendship
It  seems  that  the  need  for  a  cohesive  society,  above  all  politically,  brought  back  a
relationship that modern thought had almost always relegated to the private sphere of the I-
you relationship.  The close relationship between philia  and politiké,  characterizing the
ancient world and broken in modernity, is rethought nowadays through different theoretical
expressions and numerous figures: from fraternity to solidarity, from partner to comrade.
These figures and expressions seem to be united by direct reciprocity and elective affinity.
Above all, these interactions among individuals seem characterized by a special form of
affectivity, that “calm” feeling of mutual sympathy which is friendship. Friendship is defined
as the product of a choice that equal subjects make in favour of a harmonious sharing that
gives rise to collaborative relationships. The political body would then be cemented by
friendly feelings able to form a “we” that would make of individuals fellow citizens because
it  would promote understanding,  solidarity  and mutual  support.  So,  numerous political
studies turn to friendship, starting with the Communitarians such as McIntyre and Sanders.
This new philia should recompose the complex differentiations characterizing contemporary
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liberal-democratic societies.  According to McIntyre,  friendship is  the emotional tie that
expresses the interrelation of civic virtues that make possible the recognition of the common
good. Friendship is the bond that unites citizens: “the kind of bond between citizens which,
on Aristotle’s view, constitutes polis …is the bond of friendship and friendship is itself a
virtue”[7]
Interestingly,  the  political  relevance  of  friendship  has  been  highlighted  not  only  by
communitarians, but also by liberals. Already in the last parts of A Theory of Justice, Rawls
suggests that the obligations and duties that the principles of justice require may not be
sufficient to ensure the best possible good in a just and equitable society. Such a society
must be based on the sharing of the conception of justice, and this sharing is expressed in
the  “civic  friendship”:  “Among individuals  with  disparate  aims and purposes  a  shared
conception of justice establishes the bonds of civic friendship”.[8] So the government of a
just and fair society is not only based on rules and procedures, it requires also a sharing of
values  ​​and  friendly  interpersonal  relationships.  Inspired  by  Rawls’  observations,  other
liberal thinkers emphasized the role of friendship in the formation of public morality and
public spirit, both essential for the liberal democracy. They range from Jason Scorza[9] who
inserts references to Emerson on the Aristotelian reflection, to Thomas A. Spragens[10] who
criticizes the civic friendship proposed by Rawls as a completely impersonal form, and turns
to  the  Aristotelian  idea  of  ​ ​friendship  as  a  virtue.  Spragens  elaborates  a  form of  civil
friendship that would allow him to meet the aspirations of the four schools of liberalism he
had  previously  analyzed:  liberal  realism,  libertarianism,  liberal  egalitarianism  and  the
liberalism of difference. He calls his new way “civic liberalism”, which seeks to achieve the
liberal goals of security and tolerance, prosperity and limited government, the reduction of
social discrimination and economic inequality. The key ingredient in Spragens’s formulation
of liberalism is the “civic friendship” which, as “a condition of mutual enjoyment, affection,
and good will  among [citizens]”[11],  could fill  the shortcomings of the abovementioned
forms of liberalism.
However, Spragens does not agree with the thesis of other liberal thinkers who believe that
the friendship should relate strictly to the private sphere. On the contrary, he develops the
argument that civic friendship represents a recovery of a dimension of liberal aspirations.
According  to  Spragens,  civic  friendship  enhances  society’s  stability,  its  economic
performance and its capacity to mobilize community.[12] In short, civic friendship should
improve  the  most  important  liberal  virtues:  “Responsible  self-reliance,  respect  for  the
human  dignity  of  all  fellow  citizens,  law-abiding  self-restraint,  democratic  humility,
reasonableness and good judgment, neighbourly eunoia, and the public-spirited willingness
to participate in civic service.”[13]
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Nevertheless, this friendship may be hard to put into practice, since Spragens’s proposal
does not clarify how such friendship would be institutionalized. Friendship thus assumes an
ambiguous position between the private and public sphere, between the moral and the
political horizon, between a horizon of spontaneity and autonomy and one of normativity.
Turning to the history of political doctrines, civic or political friendship has almost always
had this ambiguous status, perhaps with one exception: the Jacobin Saint Just, friend of
Robespierre, “the incorruptible” creator of the republic of virtue.
 
Political  friendship between hostility  and unconditional  hospitality:  from Louis
Antoine de Saint Just and Carl Schmitt to Jacques Derrida
Who undoubtedly overcomes these ambiguities is Saint Just, who proposes what I’d call a
radically  utopian  and  “exclusive”  model  of  civil  friendship.  In  the  effort  of  building
republican  institutions  suited  to  form a  “Patrie”,  develop  citizen’s  resistance  to  moral
corruption,  and  its  intolerance  toward  injustice,  Saint  Just  turns  to  friendship  as  a
manifestation of the virtue and as a means of replacing all other interests with the public
interest.[14] Saint Just replaces the social role of the family and the institution of marriage
with a new one: friendship. He institutionalizes friendship and makes it the revolutionary
instrument for establishing a society of equals, where citizens voluntarily cooperate, “so
who declares not to believe in friendship”- Saint Just says- “must be banned”. [15]
In the paragraph “Des Affections” in the sixth fragment of Institutions républicains, Saint
Just describes the ideal Republic where every man (here intended as the male) at the
majority of 21, that means when he becomes fully a citoyen, has to declare at the Temple
who his friends are. This declaration must be renewed every year during the month of
Ventôse. This is a compulsory bond and subject to sanctions, because who deserts a friend,
without  a  public  justification,  or  who  doesn’t  respect  friendship,  is  banned  from  the
Republic. Friendship is the virtuous bond par excellence, and it must be present throughout
the citizen’s life; it is thus strongly regulated: the tutors of children will be chosen among
their fathers’ friends, preparing the funeral is an assignment of friends, and their remains
are put in the same tomb. It is also prescribed that friends will cry for each other.
Friends have a legal role: contracts must be drawn up only in the presence of friends; legal
disputes between two citizens have to be brought to trial in front of friends of both sides.
Friends are responsible for their friend’s crimes and are banished from the republic with
him.
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It is interesting that alongside this normative approach to friendship, Saint Just presents
marriage in an absolute individualistic and free perspective. Marriage has just to obey the
laws of love, and the bond remains private until a pregnancy occurs. Moreover, when the
couple presents itself in front of the civil registrar, he has the simple role of witness. The
marriage bond includes few juridical requirements outside the mutual consent that rules the
community or division of property and that can establish the end of it. The marriage loses its
legal and civil character, all that remains are the rights to inherit, and this is restricted to
the nuclear family. The foundation of society is not marriage and the family, both now
absolutely privatized. Friendship is the fundamental cement of the society and the State and
assumes a strong public meaning. Friendship is the real bond of the Republic, and at the
same time it is the instrument by which the civil society will be reformed. Friendship is the
relationship that has to exist among the citizens, and what makes selfish and competitive
individuals into virtuous and altruistic citizens.
As a public and permanent bond, friendship has a substantial impact on improving the
Republic’s political cohesion. He who doesn’t believe in friendship, he who has no friends, is
not a friend of virtue and is therefore not a friend of the Republic; consequently, he is a
stranger, and he is considered to be a foreigner. Saint Just tells us that the foreigner made
civil respect disappear and leads citizens to have contempt for, and to be afraid of, each
other, thus establishing a principle of jealousy between them[16]. The foreigner is the enemy
of the Republic; he wages war from the outside and undermines the Republic’s stability
from the inside. The stranger, the foreigner is the enemy and he is therefore banned (or
very  probably  guillotined):  friendship  appears  to  be  more  and  more  a  tool  of  social
homogenization. The Republic can thus become a community of virtuous friends, united by
affectional bonds. In this way the moral and normative horizon substitutes the political bond
based on the contract: the ethics takes the place of politics, not, however, without practical
and juridical consequences. We have seen that citizens are legally liable for their friends’
criminal behaviour and will also be banned from the Republic. Friends have thus a mutual
duty of control and censure, all the time wondering where the false friend who threatens the
security of the Republic is hiding. Therefore the Republic becomes a reign of denunciation
and mistrust: the reign of Terror. The Republic becomes a community of virtuous friends
with mutual emotional bonds that consolidate and guarantee membership in the social body.
But this entails excluding anyone who has no friend, and considering him a hostis, i.e. an
enemy of the state, a traitor, a stranger and foreigner.
And so, instead of wondering who and what make “us” citizens belonging to the same
political body, we are only wondering how to identify the “non friend”, the other, the enemy.
Individuals are bonded by a common sentiment, yes, but by a sentiment of resentment and
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hostility. And thus happens what Tocqueville expressed so concisely: “In politics shared
hatreds are almost always the basis of friendships”[17]
Thus a series of questions arise in face of today’s reproposal – albeit with some variations –
of friendship as the foundation of social-political cohesion.
How far  can  a  friendship  be  an  “open”  relationship?  As  well  as  in  the  interpersonal
friendship “I-you”, the other is an unwelcome element, at worst a stranger; even in politics
whoever is outside the group, class, nation, or state is the “other”, the foreigner, arousing
astonishment, anxiety and suspicion. Can the sentiment of friendship assert itself in the
political body without having to point out a common hostis, in the double sense of foreigner
and enemy?
The reference to Carl Schmitt’s most famous thesis is immediate: it reminds us that in
politics the concept of friend recalls the term “enemy”. According to Schmitt, what specifies
the nature of ‘the political’ is the distinction between friend (Freund) and enemy (Fiend):
“the specific political distinction … is that between friend and enemy.” And its function is to
denote “the utmost degree of intensity of an union or separation, of  an association or
dissociation.”[18]
Political  friendship does not therefore lead to the end of  hostility  and divisions in the
political  body.  On the contrary it  implies enmity,  since the friend /  enemy dialectic  is
constitutive of  the political.  Focusing on friendship risks only accentuating the conflict
between “who is with me / us and who is against me / us”. In politics friendship would be
understood only within this polarization. The more friends there are, the more enemies
there  are,  or  better,  the  more  enemies  will  be  created.  And  one  will  use  all  the
argumentative  power in  defining the enemy,  the  other,  rather  than defining “us”.  We
wonder if  just who has little awareness of “us”, has to evoke with greater hostility an
“other”, characterized as an enemy. It is no coincidence that Schmitt talks a lot about the
enemy and  very  little  about  the  friend!  The  enemy is  “…nevertheless,  the  other,  the
stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially
something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible.
These can neither be decided by a previously determined general norm nor by the judgment
of a disinterested and therefore neutral third party”[19]
And he goes on to say that it is up to the one who is within the conflict to decide whether
this otherness means the negation of  one’s own kind of  existence and therefore,  once
identified as an enemy, it is therefore a stranger that must be denied in his existential
totality.[20] That is to say that the stranger may be subdued or destroyed.
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Jacques Derrida’s crucial work from 1994, Politiques de l’amitié,[21] is a first attempt to
find an answer to our questions. Searching for social cement beyond the bond of laws and
the link of common interests, Derrida examines the political history of the idea of friendship,
wondering if it is constitutive of the political. Derrida’s analysis moves by “a deconstruction
of the genealogical schema, a paradoxical deconstruction”[22] of the current meaning of
political friendship. To do this, Derrida starts from a quotation, attributed to Aristotle by
Montaigne:  ‘O  my  friends,  there  is  no  friend’  and  advances  by  opening  it  to  many
interpretations. He finds the genealogical history of this quotation from Aristotle to Kant,
Cicero, Montaigne, Nietzsche and through to Carl Schmitt.
He  analyzes  the  “canonical”  interpretation  of  friendship  and  he  highlights  that  it  is
fundamentally ambiguous. From one side, since this interpretation emphasises what friends
are, or do in common, it excludes the different. According to the canonical interpretation of
friendship, the friend is “another self”. And Derrida underlines that its structure is egoistic,
and narcissistic: the friend is “A narcissistic projection of the ideal image, of its own ideal
image”.[23]
On the other side, friendship turns toward the “other”. This is the reason that the French
revolutionaries linked friendship with politics in the form of universal fraternity. Friends are
as brothers, i.e. they are bound by blood or by nature, and Derrida underlines that the
structure of friendship is androcentric. What, he asks, about sisters and sexual difference?
What  about  countless  diversities  characteristic  of  “humanity”?  “Canonical”  friendship
implies that: ”the figure of the friend, so regularly coming back on stage with the features of
the  brother…   seems  spontaneously  to  belong  to  a  familial,  fraternalist  and  thus
androcentric  configuration  of  politics”.  [24]  And  thus  (we  can  say)  an  exclusivist
configuration of politics.
Friendship therefore seems to imply an internal contradictory logic that leads us to an
outbreak of hostilities. At this point Derrida has to confront Schmitt and his interpretation of
the political based on the conceptual couple friend / enemy.
According to Schmitt, this antinomian friend / enemy logic would operate everywhere in
politics, both outside and inside the State. It would therefore not be true that the more
friendship,  the less hostility.  The greatest hostility is  between friends or brothers.  The
generalization of political friendship or fraternity thus acts to the contrary: friendship is not
the remedy of hostility, because it always implies separating friends from enemies. The
political is based, according to Schmitt, on the ability to identify enemies from friends; in
fact, if the two were identical, the political itself would disappear. Hence, as Derrida points
out, Schmitt dwells a great deal on the definition of the enemy. He warns that the enemy in
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politics is always the public enemy. We don’t have to mix the private and the public enemy.
The hostis is not the inimicus, i.e. /who we have a personal relationship of enmity. But, as
Derrida observes, this strict distinction makes Schmitt’s argument collapse. Because we can
wage war on our friend, a real war, i.e. we can destroy our friend and at the same time,
privately,  love him. Hence Derrida finds a first  semantic slip and inversion: the friend
(amicus) can be an enemy (hostis).[25] But in this way we can’t tell the friend and the
enemy apart and the political collapses.
Without here deepening Derrida’s deconstructive reading of the Concept of the Political, I
just want to recall the results of the deconstruction of the friend / enemy antinomy.
In an attempt to dismantle the idea of ​​friendship as a fraternal union based on the mirror
image of oneself, Derrida observes that friendship is not the ability to define and talk about
who is a friend, and therefore to exclude who are enemies. It is not a matter of asking, “Who
is a friend?” (And therefore “who is an enemy?”). It is a matter of asking “what is…?”
According to Derrida, this question “what is…” always supposes: “…this friendship prior to
friendships, this anterior affirmation of being-together in allocution. Such an affirmation
does not allow itself to be simply incorporated and, above all, to be presented as a present-
being (substance,  subject,  essence or existence) in the space of  an ontology,  precisely
because it opens this space up.”[26]
Friendship is linked to being together without wanting to find a common definition. On the
contrary, only in the incommensurable space, that is to say, in being together without any
common measure, one turns to the radical otherness of the other, which presents himself no
longer as an enemy (hostis) but as an unexpected and unknown guest.
The Derridean deconstruction of Schmitt’s political dichotomy friend /enemy leads us to a
concept of friendship that coincides with unconditional hospitality. Is this too angelic a
solution? Maybe. Certainly, Derrida’s proposal does not seem to be heard much today and
indeed seems completely impracticable.
In conclusion, we move at this point between two radical and divergent positions of political
theory. On the one hand the definition of the nature of the “political” by means of the
“friend / enemy” antinomy, a simple but effective definition, leads us to look for real or
constructed enemies to make the group cohesive. And so in place of that calm affection of
industrious harmony peculiar to friendship, another sentiment, hostility, prevails in society.
On the other hand, the proposal coming from the deconstruction of the Schmittian antinomy
replacing the political friendship with the ethics of unconditional hospitality seems truly
utopian today, as we face increasingly restrictive States, increasingly closed in their internal
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logic.
Our question arises again: can friendship be the emotional foundation of social-political
cohesion in a modern state?
It is not a question of seeking the “we” of the Aristotelian polis, a narrow community, nor
the “we” of a polis that would coincide with all mankind, the cosmopolitan community, a
Cosmo polis. For this reason the question arises again and again, despite the theories with
which we have tried to give an answer.




 We will not follow the path that starts from Hobbes. According to him, in the wake of the
idea of ​​man’s innate unsociability, friendship is an alliance based on personal interest, like
the state, of course, but it is only a private agreement: “By nature then we are not looking
for friends but for honour and advantage from them. This is what we are primarily after;
friends are secondary”[27]  In fact,  between the two covenants there is  a  fundamental
difference; the state is formed by a contract that gives life to mutual obligations, while
friendship is based on the gift that does not commit the other party to reciprocate:
When the transferring of right is not mutual, but one of the parties transferreth in hope to
gain thereby friendship or service from another, or from his friends; or in hope to gain the
reputation of charity, or magnanimity; or to deliver his mind from the pain of compassion; or
in hope of reward in heaven; this is not contract, but gift, free gift, grace: which words
signify one and the same thing.[28]
Therefore, we cannot turn to Hobbes, who, from the beginning, excludes that friendship
may have a public  role.   And so Hobbes starts  a  trend that  impacts  modern political
thinking: friendship is only an individual, private relationship and not a public relationship
among citizens.
One thinker, who, in modern political thought, reflected on the public role of friendship, was
Rousseau. We know that for the contractualist Rousseau, founding our mutual social duties
only on reason was too abstract. It was therefore necessary to find the sentimental roots of
social virtues. He found their origin in the piety that controls the “amour de soi“, from which
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friendship also derives, since friendship is the “partage” of the positive self-love. And civil
friendship, as a model of non-conflictual relationships, allows the development of a sense of
belonging that integrates the individual into the political body.[29]
Rousseau is certainly the inspiring source of Saint-Just.  Undoubtedly, Saint-Just radicalizes,
and greatly so, Rousseau’s conception of civil  friendship. However, even in the variant
expressed by Rousseau, the public role of friendship isn’t free from the dangers we have
previously highlighted. The political body, based on that kind of friendship, implies hostility
towards the foreigner, as indeed Rousseau himself expressed clearly in the Emile:
Every patriot is harsh to foreigners; they are only men, and nothing in his eyes. This is
drawback inevitable but not compelling. The essential thing is to be good to the people with
whom  one  lives.  Abroad,  the  Spartan  was  ambitious,  avaricious  and  iniquitous;  but
disinterestedness, equity and concord reigned within his walls. Distrust those cosmopolitans
who go to great length in their books to discover duties they do not deign to fulfil around
them.  Such  philosophers  love  the  Tartars  so  as  to  be  spared  from  loving  their
neighbours.[30]
Civil friendship is set up among fellow citizens; the others are strangers. Here again we find
the exclusion that inclusion based on civil friendship brings with it. We understand how the
Jacobin leader Saint Just was a faithful disciple of Rousseau. And yet it is not possible to
ignore the emotional foundation motivating social and political behaviour. Actually, holding
together the social body necessitates not only reason, but also common sentiments. This is
an idea that Rousseau inherited from Spinoza, among others. And it is a Spinozistic lesson
as well that these affections have to be regulated and governed appropriately.
At first sight Spinoza seems to indicate – just like Rousseau- what feelings are the most
suitable for the construction of the body politic. These would be identified when Spinoza in
the Ethics mentions friendship. Spinoza doesn’t define friendship, even if the term already
appears in the third part of Ethics.[31] At first sight it would seem that friendship is a
characteristic bond, which connects wise human beings who live according to reason. The
desire to join with other persons in friendship is what characterises “generositas”, an active
affect[32] that, together with courage (animositas), belongs to the strength of character
(fortitudo): a characteristic affection of the human being led by reason.
Generosity and its derivations, modestia,  clementia,  and so on, are forms of virtue, not
because  of  their  presumed  ability  to  stop  selfish  passions.  In  fact,  for  Spinoza,  it  is
happiness that produces virtue, not vice versa. Generosity and the other virtues are positive
affects in which the essential desire to continue to exist and enhance oneself (cupiditas)
Political Cohesion, Friendship and Hostility
makes clear and intelligible that it cannot be disjoined from the desire to help other human
beings. The relationship between generosity and self-conservation is not immediate and
direct. During our life we are exposed to meetings with other things or individuals that can
hinder or strengthen our effort of being. Now what strengthens our being is that which is in
accordance  (convenire)  with  our  own  nature.  And,  Spinoza  continues,  nothing  is  in
accordance with our nature more than other human beings, and so there is nothing in
Nature more useful to a human being than the other human beings  – homini nihil homine
utilius – .[33]
This is the reason why “utilitas” is to be understood in a strong sense: what is most useful to
us is not simply what the other human beings possess or the favours they  can do for us, but
what they are. From here it follows that the desire to join in friendship with other human
beings is a desire of accordance; it is the desire that one’s being is in accordance with that
of the other human being, and friendship itself is a desire of accordance. Moreover, because
of what we previously said, what is useful for the conservation of oneself coincides with the
good and the utility of our fellow beings. This consideration is the basis on which the
virtuous circle of  reason is  delineated,  so that all  the virtues (let’s  remember that for
Spinoza virtue means power to act) that facilitate the accord among human beings, such as
piety, justice, loyalty or honesty, can come from the research of accordance, can come from
friendship. The utility that a virtuous man searches under the guide of reason is the good
that human beings desire one for the other, and for which they cooperate with a power
equal to the sum of all  individual powers.  Therefore it  would seem that friendship, so
understood, means the rational desire to be in accordance, convenire, with other human
beings, and is the very basis of the social and political union. In this, Spinoza’s position
would be very close to that of Rousseau and Saint-Just.
But  Spinoza’s  analysis  of  friendship  does  not  end  here.  Indeed,  two clarifications  are
required.  The first  rises  from the question of  whether  friendship,  for  Spinoza,  is  only
inherent to the free and virtuous human being. The second concerns the relationship that
the human being who lives under the aegis of reason has with the State and its laws.
Let’s briefly answer the first question. Desire (cupiditas) lies in all levels of human life from
the passionate through the rational and to intellectual love. So it does not seem coherent to
think that the desire of  friendship is  an exclusive prerogative of  the rational  man. All
individuals strive to persevere in and to enhance their being, and they desire accordance
with other individuals. Indeed in E3p35 the passionate form of desire for friendship appears
at first in a tight relationship with the desire of recognition and of exclusivity.  Not only does
the passionate friendship want mutual  love in an exclusive way,  but it  also wants the
monopoly of preferences.  An essence is for Spinoza always singular and igenium indicates
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this singularity. The passionate human being as res singularis judges the good and the evil
according to his/her opinion, ex suo ingenio, and he/she often takes only his/her personal
interest into account.[34] In this form of friendship the passionate man strives to impose on
the friend his own opinion about good and evil, thus turning out to be particularly irritating.
For this reason passionate friendship is a changeable relationship that can easily turn to
hate and envy; it is a relationship exposed to fluctuatio animi, to the vacillation of feelings.
Yet friendship is a relationship possible for everyone, both for the passionate being and for
the wise man.
Moreover, friendship as desire for accordance with the others can, for the passionate human
being, be a source of joy that, as positive sentiment, can begin the “virtuous circle” of the
active affects  and so help the individual  to  become rational.  But  does this  mean that
friendship can be considered the basis of the political body? Can the state stir up friendships
to make citizens rational and free? All the virtues of the wise man: doing good for others,
seeking harmony, helping others and desiring to unite them with friendship, are “inner”
personal conditions. They have a value in external behaviour, and therefore in social bonds,
but  under  no circumstances  can they  be directed from the outside.  The State  cannot
produce fortitude or generosity in its citizens. The rational human being by his own essence
desires (cupit) to observe the criteria of common life and collective utility, and consequently
desires (cupit) to live according to social rules and norms. But if all human beings were
rational, living together in harmony and following the collective utility would be a natural
automatism coming from the spontaneous cohesion of everyone’s cupiditas and we would
not need the State. But not all human beings are rational; on the contrary, all human beings
are  “passionibus  obnoxious”,  “traversed  by  passions”[35],  including  the  wise  man.
Therefore, living freely according to reason is never an acquired state once and for all, but
is a continuous realisation, an effort that always fluctuates between self-  strengthening
(rationality) and deprivation. Spinoza tells us that we are all  “ut maris undae”[36], “as
waves in the sea”, exposed to passions, to illnesses, to death.
So here is the “naturaliter” need of the political Community, whose laws cannot, however,
prescribe that its citizens be rational and thus free. “Freedom of spirit or strength of Mind is
the virtue of a private citizen: the virtue of a state is its security.”[37] The State cannot
impose on me to become rational and free, the State cannot impose on me to desire to make
friends  with  other  human beings,  as  it  will  happen for  the  Jacobins!  The  State  must
guarantee the security that permits the citizens can become rational and free!  This is the
meaning of The Theological Political Treatise’s statement saying the aim of the State is
security and freedom. Neither can the State entrust its stability only to the honesty of its
administrators. According to Spinoza, the State will be very precarious when its security
Political Cohesion, Friendship and Hostility
depends on the honesty of an individual and when affairs can be well led only if they are in
honest hands. On the other hand, it is necessary that public affairs are organized so that
who directs them, whether passionate or rational human beings, administrate public affairs
in a good way.[38]
Lastly, let us try to outline what kind of socio-political union we can develop by focusing
only on public friendship. Spinoza tells us something very disturbing.[39] He says that
friendship, understood as the basis of politics, can provoke a process that leads to the
dissolution of the state whose purpose is security and freedom. For example, we could think
of a group of people living close to each other. These people do not use reason. They
recognize  as  human  beings  only  those  who  are  perceived  as  similar  on  the  basis  of
characteristics that the instinctive inclination of the group makes them admire. Based on
this admiration, these individuals are bound by a feeling of passionate friendship. If one of
them becomes the real or imaginary victim of an injustice, the others can respond with
indignation, that is, with hatred against the one who has wronged the one they recognize as
one of their own group. Hatred and hostility will be the more intense the more the real or
imaginary guilty party is dissimilar from the group. The desire for revenge is born; revenge
is a consequence of hatred and hostility. The mimesis of the affects triggers off in everyone
the desire for revenge and for joining the others with the same purpose. So the collective
power of a multitude is realized: an “imperium democraticum“, a democratic power. This
power is exercised informally by a multitude. This power is collective and is united by a
common affection of hostility, born of passionate friendship. Undoubtedly, this union is not
idyllic. What is disturbing in the Spinozistic lesson is that the instinctive and affective form
of  political  union  based  on  private  feelings  could  be  lynching.  Can  we  consider  this
“imperium democraticum” – characterized by the power of summary executions on the basis
of citizen’s private sentiments, without prior judicial condemnation – a state whose purpose
must be to guarantee security and freedom?
Spinoza is drastic. He tells us that hate and hostility and all affects related to them, such as
Derision, Contempt, Wrath, Revenge, are intrinsically bad. “Hatred can never be good.”[40]
. And when we wish to destroy the enemy we hate, this desire is shameful from the private
point of view, and unjust from the public civil point of view.[41]So by trying to destroy the
enemy, we first destroy ourselves and our civitas. Hate and hostility are sad affections that
diminish the power of the individual and immobilize him in irrationality and social servitude.
In a community dominated by impotence and disintegration, citizens are more committed to
finding and banning enemies rather than to building institutional systems that help good
governance.
Although Spinoza states that there cannot be a political body without an affective cohesion,
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he doesn’t indicate one sentiment as more suitable than others to make a people cohesive.
Any sentiment used to maintain the cohesion of a political community, even the most noble,
has its limits and dangers, including friendship. He notes its effectiveness, but also its limits.
A fortiori this leads us to reflect on the dangers of thinking the antinomy friend / enemy as
constitutive of the politics: it is ultimately more disruptive than aggregating. On the other
hand, the proposal of universal hospitality would imply that all human beings were rational
and wise, which they are not.
Spinoza helps  us  reformulate  our  implicit  initial  question.  We need to  understand the
emotional causes underlying tyranny, superstition, nationalism and demagogy. But instead
of proposing other emotional means for uniting and directing a political community, it is
necessary to ask ourselves how to fight  the sad passions in politics  to  try  to develop
institutions that are more effective because they are more rational.
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